World Bank Home
 
More World Bank Blogs
 
Thu, 13/03/2008

Given the recent bombings in Pakistan, it may be worth asking whether these are "special events" or indicators of a general upsurge in violence.

Here are 4 pictures showing what has happened to reported crime rates and the number of police stations in Pakistan between 1997 and 2006. The red line in each shows the year that Musharraf came to power. All crime as well as murder, attempted murder and kidnapping declined till 2001. Since then, they all started rising and increased particularly fast after 2003. The picture on the bottom right shows the increase in police stations in the four main provinces—Punjab, NWFP, Sindh and Balochistan; the number is normalized to 100 for each province in 1999. There is little or no increase in the first three, but in Balochistan the total number of police stations increased by 62 percent…

The pictures are all sourced from data presented in the Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 2006, linked here.




Wed, 12/03/2008

There has been active discussion about Arvind Panagariya’s column on improving health care in India. Shanta pointed out that increasing the number of trained medics is unlikely to solve India’s health problems if these medics don’t show up for work. Arvind responded that his recommendation of increasing the number of MBBS was based on the idea that they would work as “private practitioners and not add to the rolls of absentee providers in the public sector”. This assumes that the main constraint on good quality medical advice is doctor’s knowledge. What do the data say?

A new paper summarizes work on the quality of care in low-income countries that I and my colleagues Jeffrey Hammer (Princeton) and Ken Leonard (University of Maryland) have been engaged in over the last 5 years. Our approach has been to try and decompose the quality of medical advice into two components—what doctors know and what doctors do. What doctors know—measured by testing doctors—represents the maximum care that a doctor could provide. What doctors do—measured by watching doctors—represents the care they actually provide to real patients. We call the first “competence” and the second “practice quality”.




Mon, 12/11/2007

Debating Shanta’s blog on the emergency, we worried about missing the deck chairs for the titanic—are facts on performance important at this point in Pakistan’s history? From the comments to Shanta’s post, it does appear that Pakistan’s performance in the last two decades will inform the current debate. This perspective finds broader acceptance. The Pakistan Policy Blog’s excellent summary of Negroponte’s appearance on the hill included the following:

Since 9/11:
• the Pakistani government has arrested or killed more al-Qaeda and Taliban than any other country;
• Pakistan’s economy has grown rapidly;
• civil society and media have grown “events of recent days notwithstanding”;
• There is a more participatory national debate;
• Human rights and civil society organizations are more prominent than in the past;
• Pakistan has become a more moderate and prosperous country since Musharraf has come into power;
• But only civilian democracy can secure a prosperous future for Pakistan
Source: Pakistan Policy blog




Tue, 23/10/2007

With a new round of funding for the Sarva-Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) program in India underway, it’s worth highlighting (again) just how little children are learning in school. Pratham’s great work with the Annual State of Education Report (ASER) shows that in 2005, 53.6 percent of all children aged 7-10 could not solve a subtraction or a division problem and 79.4 percent could not solve a simple division problem. Since most children (more than 93 percent) are enrolled, the numbers reflect what they learn in school.

Data from 112 villages with a private school in Punjab province of Pakistan in 2003 reflect similar problems. These data, collected as part of the Learning and Educational Attainment in Punjab or LEAPS project (more on this later), include mathematics test-scores for children in Grades 3, 4 and 5. The figure on the left shows the current enrollment status of all 10-year olds in these villages. The figure on the right shows the percentage of 10-year olds who can add or subtract single digit numbers.




Fri, 12/10/2007

At a recent talk, the speaker made the interesting observation that one of the problems in Bihar (one of India’s traditionally under-performing states) has been that it’s not corrupt enough. Following the famous “Fodder Scam” (buying lots of fodder for non-existent cattle), a signal was sent out that there should not be a whiff of corruption from projects in the state. The bureaucracy clamped down and for 15 years the best way to avoid accusations of corruption was to do absolutely nothing.

Finding empirical evidence for the hypothesis that “greater vigilance leads to less action” is difficult, but this is precisely what Abhijit Banerjee, Shawn Cole and Esther Duflo manage to do in their paper on vigilance and bank lending. The figure below says it all:

The blue line is the change in credit (logs) plotted against time relative to the time when an officer in a bank-branch faces an anti-corruption charge—so -1 is one quarter before the event, 2 is 2 quarters after and so on. Credit falls the quarter of the enquiry—not only for the officer who is investigated but the entire bank branch. As the authors put it, “relative to an unaffected branch, a branch in which an officer is accused of corruption experiences a 20 percent decline in credit over a period of two years.”




Thu, 04/10/2007

My profound confusion about urban schooling follows from a talk, a website and a conversation with my colleague Partha.

First, the talk. An NGO based in Delhi operates a school for children in slums. For the longest time, they have tried to “register” the school so that the children can participate in central examinations and receive an appropriate school-leaving certificate. They were unsuccessful. In the end, they had to go through the “open schooling” system, certificates from which are discounted on the labor market. The reason for their failure was the elaborate system of regulations and rules under the Delhi Education Act of 1973.

The act requires lots of paperwork, schools that have playground facilities, teachers who are paid “an equivalent amount to teachers in schools run by the administration”, laboratory facilities, a library that is well stocked—you get the picture (one gem is the bit on corporal punishment, where head-teachers are allowed to cane erring students, but the caning has to be restricted to “10 strokes on the palm of the hand”).

Next, website #1. Go to the wikipedia entry on Delhi Public School, Mathura Road. As the entry assures us, the school is built on a “sprawling” 15 acres of land given to it by the government in 1949 and coincidentally, is right next to one of the most posh localities in Delhi. Here is a simple calculation: multiply 15 * the price per acre. That’s what you get if you sell the land today. Divide by 10% (the interest rate on a one year CD in India) to get the annualized value. Divide by 4000 (the number of students) to get the annual per-student subsidy from the school. The result is a staggering Rs.700,00 per year, or close to Rs.60,000 ($1500) per month. That’s in a city where the income per capita is less than $1000 a year.

My thinking: There is no way that a private school is going to come up in this area without government subsidies at that price. In fact, the subsidy does not make sense even if you take into account estimates of the returns to education.

My first source of confusion. Comparing subsidies in this way is wrong, since you have to account for land appreciation as well. One way in which economists deal with asset appreciation is to follow Hotelling’s rule, which says that you should compare the interest rate you get from selling it today and keeping the money in the bank to holding on to the asset and selling it tomorrow at a higher price. Getting back to the school, there are now two choices:
a. Tell students that the school is being shut down and they will get Rs.60,000 a month, but have to get educated somewhere else. Most parents would probably take the offer—a top-notch private school outside the city costs around Rs.20,000 a month.
b. Taking land appreciation into account, you could also make another offer: “wait a year, and I will give you Rs.70,000 a month (yes, land prices are going up faaassttt) after closing down the school.”

I don’t have enough data to figure out which should happen, but neither is particularly satisfactory. Under option (a) all schools eventually leave the city; under option (b) there is a (probably) perpetual subsidy from present to future generations.

Finally, the conversation. As Partha points out, schools generate externalities, so the relevant question is “what would the land price be if there were (taking it to the extreme) there were no schools in the city?” In the U.S., school quality is incorporated into housing prices. Although in Delhi it’s only recently that legislation has been passed that requires a “close-to-school” residence requirement, it’s probably true that land prices would drop as schools migrated out. This was turning out to be an impossible problem, since empirical estimates for “land prices in the absence of schools” are non-existent and likely to remain so.

Fortunately, Partha also suggests a solution. Instead of looking at buying and selling land, why not look at land rents, which price in the appreciation of land over time? This makes life easier. Even in the posh localities of Delhi, land rents are around Rs.400 per square foot. Take 200 square feet for a classroom with 40 students and you get a much more reasonable price of Rs.2000 ($50 per month). Although not affordable to everyone, upper-middle income groups and the rich (who would send their children to schools in posh localities) could easily pay this every month.
 
The problem though is that a classroom is not enough. According to our government, a school cannot run unless it has a playground, laboratory facilities, a library, a staff room, a place for students to spit (!) and a host of other requirements. Neither is this a problem of only posh localities with high land prices—our speaker from the NGO assured us that if they tried to fulfill all the infrastructure requirements of the Delhi Education Act, it would cost them Rs.18,000 a year per child—that’s half the average per-capita income of individuals in the city, and about 3 times the per-capita income of people living in slums.

Although the luminaries who thought up the act probably wanted a holistic education for children in the city, they have ended up guaranteeing a tremendous supply crunch that can only get worse over time. So much so that an expert body had to recently legislate how schools could admit students (more on this later). Meanwhile, the only way to educate the poor is to stay under the radar, hope you don’t get noticed and live under the perpetual threat of your school being closed down.





The World bank Group Homepage Home Contact Legal Disclaimer Log-in