Several of the comments around my seminar  “Can South Asia End Poverty in a Generation?” were critical of the World Bank’s role in the subcontinent’s development.  One commentator asked: “As the first step towards eradicating poverty in South Asia, how about closing the World Bank?”  This theme was echoed by the Independent People’s Tribunal on the World Bank (this site was down at the time of posting) as summarized in a recent article in SAMAR.

Broadly, these critics are making two points.  One is that the World Bank has “pressured” South Asian countries into adopting policies that it thought would foster economic development.  The second is that these policies were misguided, that they didn’t lead to poverty reduction.  These points are worth separating because we can discuss each of them individually. 

Take the first point, that the Bank forced countries to adopt certain policies.  Note that this assumes that the Bank has leverage with these countries.  But the same article in SAMAR points out that India is one of the Bank’s four largest borrowers, and an extremely reliable one at that.  “Without a few reliable clients such as India, the World Bank would be hard pressed to continue its operations.”  This sounds as if it is India that has leverage over the Bank, not the other way around.
 
Even if the Bank doesn’t have leverage over a large country such as India, it may have leverage at the state level.  India has never had a policy-based (what used to be called “structural adjustment”) loan at the national level, but there have been about half a dozen at the state level.  But here too, it is hard to sustain the notion that the state governments were “pressured” to adopt certain policies.  Take the case of Andhra Pradesh, which has had three such loans.  Almost all the policies supported by these loans were based on the state’s own document, Andhra Pradesh’s Vision 2020.  In addition, consider the following:  AP, like many other state governments in India, had a policy of free power to farmers.  Most of the evidence showed that this policy (together with the household power subsidy) cost the state about 0.5 percent of GDP, led to deteriorating services, lowered the water table (because farmers used the free power on pumpsets) and in any event a substantial part of it did not go to poor farmers.  With all this evidence, the Bank would have wanted these states to reform these policies.  Yet reforming the free power policy has never been a condition of the AP loans.  Why?  Because everyone knew that it was too political an issue.  The government would not do it, even if it meant forgoing the World Bank loan.  The simple fact is that the Bank cannot pressure a government to do something it doesn’t want to do.  To politicians, getting re-elected is more important than getting a World Bank loan.

Leaving aside the question of whether these policies were imposed by the Bank or not,  let us turn to the second point, that the policies associated with the Bank made poverty worse.  This is of course difficult to prove.  But we can examine some of the “evidence” that is brought to bear.  For instance, people often point to trade liberalization as harming the poor because it causes many people to lose their jobs.  Most policies have winners and losers, and it’s tempting to point to the losers (who are easily identifiable) and claim that the policies were unambiguously harmful.  But as we have found in countries such as Bangladesh, the winners are often the poor who now have jobs in garment export factories, and there are 2 million of them against the 100,000 or so who lost their jobs in the protected industries.

In fact, when you look at the broad direction of policies that South Asian countries adopted in the past two decades--trade liberalization, industrial de-regulation, financial sector reforms, telecommunications de-regulation--and the rapid growth and poverty reduction that South Asia has been experiencing in the past decade and a half, you can’t help but think that there is a connection. 

Furthermore, when you look closely at what is stopping people from escaping poverty--low productivity in agriculture, slow employment growth, poor health and education services--you typically find a “government failure,” one that these reform policies are trying to correct.  Sri Lanka has a policy that requires certain farmers to grow only rice, whereas other crops would be more profitable.  South Asia’s labor regulations--some of the most restrictive in the world--prevent firms from hiring new entrants into the labor market.  And the poor quality of public health and education services in Pakistan and northern India can be improved if medical and teachers’ unions will allow reforms such as vouchers and contracting out to the private sector, as Bangladesh has done.

I look forward to the discussion.